Volume 58, Issue 5 p. 1035-1044
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Open Access

Medicare advantage and dialysis facility choice

Jeffrey Marr BA

Corresponding Author

Jeffrey Marr BA

Department of Health Policy and Management, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Baltimore, Maryland, USA

Correspondence

Jeffrey Marr, BA, Department of Health Policy and Management, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, 624 N Broadway, Baltimore, MD 21205, USA.

Email: jmarr5@jhu.edu

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Yaa Akosa Antwi PhD

Yaa Akosa Antwi PhD

Johns Hopkins Carey Business School, Baltimore, Maryland, USA

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Daniel Polsky PhD

Daniel Polsky PhD

Department of Health Policy and Management, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Baltimore, Maryland, USA

Johns Hopkins Carey Business School, Baltimore, Maryland, USA

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First published: 22 March 2023

Abstract

Objective

To compare the characteristics of dialysis facilities used by traditional Medicare (TM) and Medicare advantage (MA) enrollees with end-stage kidney disease (ESKD).

Data Sources

We used 20% TM claims and 100% MA encounter data from 2018 and publicly available data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.

Study Design

We compared the characteristics of the dialysis facilities treating TM and MA patients in the same ZIP code, adjusting for patient characteristics. The outcome variables were facility ownership, distance to the facility, and several measures of facility quality.

Data Collection/Extraction

We identified point prevalent dialysis patients as of July 15, 2018.

Principal Findings

Compared to TM patients in the same ZIP code, MA patients were 1.84 percentage points more likely to be treated at facilities owned by the largest two dialysis organizations and 1.85 percentage points less likely to be treated at an independently owned facility. MA patients went to further and lower quality facilities than TM patients in the same ZIP code. However, these differences in facility quality were modest. For example, while the mean dialysis facility mortality rate was 21.85, the difference in mortality rates at facilities treating MA and TM patients in the same ZIP code was 0.67 deaths per 100 patient-years. Similarly, MA patients went to facilities that were, on average, 0.15 miles further than TM patients in the same ZIP code.

Conclusion

MA enrollees with ESKD were more likely than TM enrollees in the same ZIP code to use the dialysis facilities owned by the two largest chains, travel further for care, and receive care at lower quality facilities. While the magnitude of differences in facility distance and quality was modest, the direction of these results underscores the importance of monitoring dialysis network adequacy as ESKD MA enrollment continues to grow.

What is known on this topic

  • Medicare advantage (MA) enrollment among beneficiaries with end-stage kidney disease (ESKD) is expected to grow because of recent policy changes.
  • Most ESKD patients are treated with dialysis. Two large dialysis organizations that control about 75% of the outpatient dialysis market charge high prices to MA plans
  • The impact of the concentrated dialysis market on how MA plans form dialysis provider networks, and where MA patients are treated is unknown.

What this study adds

  • In 2018, MA patients were more likely than TM patients in the same ZIP code to be treated at facilities owned by the two largest dialysis organizations.
  • There were substantial differences in the ownership of the treating facility across MA carriers, suggesting preferred relationships between large providers and carriers.
  • Compared to TM patients in the same ZIP code, MA patients go to further and lower-quality facilities, though these differences were modest.

1 INTRODUCTION

About half a million people in the United States with end-stage kidney disease (ESKD), a condition characterized by permanent and irreversible kidney damage, rely on regular dialysis treatment to keep them alive unless they are one of the relatively few to receive a kidney transplant. Unlike those with most other chronic medical conditions, patients with this diagnosis can enroll in Medicare, regardless of age. In 2019, total traditional Medicare (TM) expenditures for beneficiaries with ESKD, were $51 billion, representing 7.2% of total TM spending.1

Medicare advantage (MA), a type of Medicare health plan offered by a private insurance company, has historically played a limited role in insuring ESKD patients. Because this is changing, a closer look at outpatient dialysis treatment differences between MA and TM is needed. In 2019, only 22% of ESKD patients with Medicare coverage were enrolled in MA compared with 39% of all Medicare beneficiaries in 2019.2 Lower ESKD enrollment into MA is no accident. Patients not already enrolled in MA at the time of kidney failure were only able to enroll in ESKD-specific MA Special Needs Plans (SNP) or in MA plans offered by their insurer at the time of kidney failure.3 The 21st Century Cures Act lifted MA enrollment restrictions for ESKD patients starting in 2021.3 MA enrollment among ESKD beneficiaries grew by about a third after the first open enrollment period.4

In this study, we focus on the differences in the dialysis facilities where MA and TM ESKD patients receive their dialysis treatment using data from 2018. Unlike in TM, MA plans can negotiate payment rates with providers, manage a restricted provider network, and steer patients to in-network providers. This is particularly consequential for ESKD patients in dialysis treatment because of the wide variation in facility quality.5 In addition, past work suggests that while many dialysis patients are treated at the closest dialysis facility, there is often a nearby facility of higher quality.6 Given the landscape of dialysis quality, one possibility is that MA plans might encourage patients to more actively choose facilities based on quality by steering patients toward slightly further but higher quality facilities.

The market structure of the dialysis industry is unique. There has been dramatic consolidation of the dialysis industry over the last several decades. In 1995, 41% of the market was controlled by seven dialysis organizations.7 In 2020, two large firms, DaVita and Fresenius, owned 75% of facilities.8 Past research has shown that chain acquisitions increase Medicare expenditures and decrease quality of care9 and that MA plans pay substantially higher rates for dialysis than TM, particularly at DaVita and Fresenius facilities.10

MA plans may respond in different ways to the strong negotiating position of the dialysis providers. Plans may steer patients toward providers with less pricing power, like independent facilities or smaller chains to avoid paying high prices. The market share of DaVita and Fresenius may, however, limit the ability of MA plans to form adequate networks without including these facilities. Ultimately, the results of negotiations between MA plans and dialysis providers shape access to, and quality of, dialysis care for MA beneficiaries with ESKD. Yet, how these market factors are reflected in differences in facility choices by TM and MA patients is unknown. Understanding how the interaction of dialysis providers and payers affects facility access and quality is important because of the critical role of the dialysis facility in ESKD care. Moreover, because dialysis facilities with market power charge high prices, facility choice may also have implications for the overall costs of care in the MA program.

We examine dialysis facility choice by MA beneficiaries with ESKD in the context of a concentrated provider market with data from 2018, before the 21st Century Cures Act removed ESKD MA enrollment restrictions. We compare differences in the ownership of facilities treating MA and TM patients living in the same ZIP code, while also examining differences in access and facility quality. Our analysis provides a first look at the role of MA in dialysis facility choice in the context of this concentrated market.

2 METHODS

2.1 Data and study population

We used several data sources. First, we used 20% fee-for-service (FFS) outpatient claims and 100% MA outpatient encounter data from 2018 to identify dialysis visits by ESKD beneficiaries in TM and MA, respectively. Although there are concerns about the completeness of MA encounter data, past research has demonstrated that the quality of dialysis encounter data is relatively high.11 We also used the 100% Medicare Beneficiary Summary File to obtain beneficiary characteristics and enrollment information. Second, we obtained quality and ownership information on dialysis facilities for the performance periods ending December 31, 2018 from Dialysis Facility Compare. We also used data from Dialysis Facility Reports, combined with information derived from FFS claims, to identify treating facilities based on the National Provider Identifier (NPI) listed on MA encounters. Finally, we used publicly reported data on MA plans and contracts, including the plan type, the contract quality rating, and an indicator for whether the plan was an ESKD SNP.12 We linked this plan and contract data to the plan and contract of MA patients as of July 2018.

We used outpatient dialysis claims and encounters (bill type 72) that began before and ended after July 15, 2018 to identify point prevalent MA and TM dialysis patients. We attributed each patient to one treating facility and excluded patients with encounters or claims without a corresponding dialysis facility in Dialysis Facility Compare (N = 2264). We excluded patients treated with dialysis for acute kidney injury rather than ESKD (N = 524), patients outside of the 50 states and the District of Columbia (N = 1968), patients with both a TM claim and MA encounter (N = 45), and those not in the master beneficiary summary file (N < 11). In each regression, we exclude those with insufficient data on the outcome variables of interest. Our main sample consisted of 142,050 patients (weighted N = 385,034).

2.2 Outcomes

The outcomes of interest were the ownership and quality of the treating facility. First, we used data on facility ownership as of December 31, 2018 to classify facilities by ownership. We classified facilities as owned by Fresenius, DaVita, other dialysis organizations, or independent organizations. We considered facilities as owned by other dialysis organizations if they were owned by American Renal Associates, Dialysis Clinics, Inc., or US Renal Care, Inc.

Second, distance traveled is an important measure of quality and access because patients often travel to a dialysis facility three times a week for treatment. Even for home dialysis patients who often go to a facility monthly, distance remains an important consideration when selecting a facility.13 We calculated the distance, in miles, between a dialysis facility and the centroid of the patients' ZIP code tabulation area using the Haversine formula. Patients with over 100 miles to their treating facility were coded as missing because this may indicate the patient ZIP code is inaccurate or the patient is away from home.

Finally, we used four Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) publicly-reported measures of facility quality to ensure that our results are robust to different definitions of quality. The measures are: risk-adjusted mortality rate, five-star rating, end-stage renal disease quality incentive program (QIP) total performance core (TPS), and an indicator for whether the facility was penalized under the QIP. The facility mortality rate is case-mix adjusted for age, sex, race, ethnicity, cause of ESKD, duration of ESKD, body mass index, and comorbidities. The resulting variable can be interpreted as the number of deaths per 100 patient-years at risk.14 Although this rate may be affected by unobserved differences in facilities or random variation, the high mortality rate among dialysis patients and the difficulty of “gaming” mortality statistics makes it a useful measure of the quality of care. The five-star rating is a patient care rating of a dialysis facility relative to others. The rating is a summary of quality care measures such as avoiding death, hospitalizations, and hospital readmissions. The rating ranges from 1 to 5 stars with 3-stars as the average. A 5-star rating means a facility is “much above average” compared with others and a 1 or 2-star rating means a facility is below average. The QIP TPS is a composite of several quality measures, including dialysis adequacy, vascular access, and measures of health care utilization. Facility scores range from 0 to 100 and are calculated based on achievement (facility performance relative to prospectively set benchmarks) or improvement (facility performance relative to own past performance). QIP TPS is used to determine reductions of up to 2% of TM payments.14 Over 40% of facilities were penalized based on 2018 data.15

2.3 Statistical analysis

We first present summary characteristics of TM and MA patients. We then estimated ordinary least squares regressions that compared the quality and ownership of the treating dialysis facilities of MA and TM patients living in the same ZIP codes. Patients living in the same ZIP code likely face the same set of potential facility choices, regardless of their MA/TM status. We captured this in our model with patient ZIP code fixed effects. Among those with the same set of nearby facilities, differences in TM and MA facility choice may reflect MA plan design factors like networks. We accounted for differences in patient characteristics by adjusting for dual eligibility status, race and ethnicity, sex, original reason for Medicare entitlement, age, and age squared in all regressions. We do not adjust for dialysis modality because it is endogenous to facility choice.

Because MA carriers may pursue different network formation strategies, we also examined differences between the ownership of facilities treating TM and MA patients stratified by MA carrier. We used publicly reported MA parent organization to classify plans as operated by United Healthcare, Humana, Aetna, Blue Cross Blue Shield, Kaiser, or a parent organization that is not one of the largest five carriers, as determined by overall enrollment. In addition to carriers with Blue Cross Blue Shield in the parent organization name, we also considered Anthem, Highmark, and Premera to be Blue Cross Blue Shield plans. In addition to our primary analyses of differences in facility quality, we also considered whether facility quality differs between TM and different types of MA plans, stratified by large carrier status and plan type (Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) or Preferred Provider Organization (PPO)). We considered each of these stratifications by plan characteristic in separate regressions.

Because we used a 20% sample of FFS claims and 100% of MA encounters, we weighted TM and MA patients by the inverse probability of being in our sample. This research was determined to be exempt by the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health Institutional Review Board.

3 RESULTS

3.1 Sample description

Our sample included 142,050 dialysis patients (weighted N = 385,034), with 60,746 enrolled in TM (weighted N = 303,730) and the remaining 81,304 enrolled in MA (weighted N = 81,304) (see Table 1). On average, MA patients (mean age = 70.0) were older than TM patients (mean age = 63.3). TM patients were more likely to have originally enrolled in Medicare because of ESKD or ESKD and disability. These differences in age and enrollment likely reflect the policies restricting MA enrollment for ESKD patients during the study period. MA patients were also less likely than TM patients to be dually eligible for Medicaid and less likely to use peritoneal dialysis.

TABLE 1. Characteristics of Medicare dialysis patients, by Medicare advantage and traditional Medicare enrollment.
Patient characteristics Traditional Medicare Medicare advantage p-value
N = 60,746 N = 81,304
Weighted N = 303,730 Weighted N = 81,304
Age, mean (SD) 63.3 (14.24) 70.02 (11.73) <0.001
Age <0.001
0–17 62 (0.1%) 0 (0.0%)
18–44 6282 (10.3%) 2724 (3.4%)
45–64 23,812 (39.2%) 19,046 (23.4%)
65–74 16,958 (27.9%) 28,702 (35.3%)
75+ 13,632 (22.4%) 30,832 (37.9%)
Original reason for entitlement <0.001
Age 19,002 (31.3%) 40,967 (50.4%)
Disability 13,432 (22.1%) 25,314 (31.1%)
ESKD 17,753 (29.2%) 7608 (9.4%)
Disability and ESKD 10,559 (17.4%) 7415 (9.1%)
Race/Ethnicity <0.001
Non-Hispanic White 23,234 (38.2%) 30,536 (37.6%)
Black 22,090 (36.4%) 27,596 (33.9%)
Asian/Pacific Islander 2890 (4.8%) 4172 (5.1%)
Hispanic 10,142 (16.7%) 17,115 (21.1%)
American Indian/Alaska Native 1064 (1.8%) 334 (0.4%)
Other 651 (1.1%) 1058 (1.3%)
Unknown 675 (1.1%) 493 (0.6%)
Sex <0.001
Male 34,011 (56.0%) 44,124 (54.3%)
Female 26,735 (44.0%) 37,180 (45.7%)
Dual eligibility 30,708 (50.5%) 32,332 (39.8%) <0.001
Modality <0.001
Hemodialysis 55,026 (90.6%) 74,131 (91.2%)
Peritoneal dialysis 5702 (9.4%) 6979 (8.6%)
Unknown 18 (0.0%) 194 (0.2%)
  • Note: Includes point prevalent Medicare dialysis patients on July 15, 2018, as determined in 20% fee-for-service claims and 100% Medicare advantage encounter data. p-values were calculated using a t-test for continuous age and a chi-squared test for all other variables.
  • Abbreviations: ESKD, end-stage kidney disease; SD, standard deviation.

3.2 Differences in dialysis facility ownership

Compared to TM patients living in the same ZIP code, MA patients were 1.84 percentage points (95% CI: 1.34, 2.33) more likely to be treated at a facility owned by Fresenius or DaVita. The probability that an MA patient was treated at an independently owned facility was 1.85 percentage point lower (95% CI: −2.26, −1.44) than TM patients in the same ZIP code. There was no difference in the probability of being treated at a facility owned by other dialysis organizations (see Figure 1).

Details are in the caption following the image
Differences in ownership of facilities treating Medicare advantage versus traditional Medicare dialysis patients. Includes point prevalent Medicare dialysis patients on July 15, 2018, as determined in 20% fee-for-service claims and 100% Medicare advantage encounter data. Values are ordinary least squares regression coefficients and 95% confidence intervals of the association between Medicare advantage enrollment (versus Traditional Medicare enrollment) and the given ownership variable, which was coded as 0/1 and used in separate regressions. Values are multiplied by 100 to represent percentage point differences in probability. A vertical line is shown at zero, which would indicate in no difference in use of the given ownership type across traditional Medicare and Medicare advantage. All regressions include ZIP code fixed effects and adjust for dual eligibility status, race/ethnicity, sex, original reason for Medicare entitlement, age, and age squared. Observations were weighted by the inverse probability of being in the data. Facilities are classified as owned by other dialysis organizations if they are owned by American Renal Associates, Dialysis Clinics, Inc., or US Renal Care, Inc. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

These aggregate results, however, mask heterogeneity across MA carriers, which we investigate in Table 2, while also considering each large dialysis organization separately. For example, compared to TM patients in the same ZIP code, MA patients in United Healthcare plans were 1.85 (95% CI: 1.07, 2.63) and 0.73 (95% CI: 0.24, 1.22) percentage points more likely to be treated at Fresenius and other dialysis organization facilities, respectively, but 1.00 (95% CI: −1.78, −0.22) and 1.58 (95% CI: −2.14, −1.03) percentage points less likely to be treated at DaVita and independent facilities, respectively. Patients in Humana and Blue Cross Blue Shield MA plans were more likely to be treated at DaVita facilities and less likely to be treated at Fresenius facilities. The magnitude of estimates for Kaiser plans was particularly large. Enrollees in Kaiser MA plans were 15.82 (95% CI: 14.43, 17.21) percentage points more likely to visit a Fresenius facility and less likely to visit facilities owned by other providers. Overall, these results suggest that each of the five largest health insurance carriers may steer patients toward facilities owned by one of the two largest dialysis organizations and away from independently owned facilities. There may also be additional heterogeneity within carrier, such as differences across plans that our analysis was not able to capture.

TABLE 2. Ownership differences in facilities treating Medicare advantage and traditional Medicare dialysis patients, by Medicare advantage plan carrier.
Insurer N Facility owner
Fresenius DaVita Other dialysis organization Independent
TM 60,703 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
United Healthcare 21,235 1.85*** −1.00** 0.73*** −1.58***
[1.07, 2.63] [−1.78, −0.22] [0.24, 1.22] [−2.14, −1.03]
Humana 13,537 −1.04** 2.61*** −0.00 −1.56***
[−1.97, −0.11] [1.66, 3.56] [−0.59, 0.58] [−2.20, −0.93]
Blue Cross Blue Shield 9367 −4.78*** 6.34*** −1.16*** −0.40
[−5.79, −3.77] [5.16, 7.52] [−1.80, −0.52] [−1.29, 0.50]
Aetna 6391 −0.95 1.42** 0.97** −1.43***
[−2.27, 0.36] [0.09, 2.74] [0.10, 1.84] [−2.32, −0.55]
Kaiser 7678 15.82*** −6.75*** −1.77*** −7.30***
[14.43, 17.21] [−8.24, −5.26] [−2.51, −1.04] [−8.42, −6.17]
Other 23,033 −2.12*** 3.25*** 0.11 −1.24***
[−2.89, −1.35] [2.45, 4.04] [−0.35, 0.56] [−1.85, −0.62]
Mean 36.70 37.18 9.17 16.95
N 141,942 141,942 141,942 141,942
Weighed N 384,746 384,746 384,746 384,746
  • Note: Includes point prevalent Medicare dialysis patients on July 15, 2018, as determined in 20% fee-for-service claims and 100% Medicare advantage encounter data. Values are ordinary least squares regression coefficients and 95% confidence intervals of the association between Medicare advantage enrollment (versus Traditional Medicare enrollment) and the given ownership variable, which was coded as 0/1. Values are multiplied by 100 to represent percentage point differences in probability. All regressions include ZIP code fixed effects and adjust for dual eligibility status, race/ethnicity, sex, original reason for Medicare entitlement, age, and age squared. Observations were weighted by the inverse probability of being in the data. Facilities are classified as owned by other dialysis organizations if they are owned by American Renal Associates, Dialysis Clinics, Inc., or US Renal Care, Inc.
  • Abbreviations: MA, Medicare advantage; TM, traditional Medicare.
  • * p < 0.1.
  • ** p < 0.05.
  • *** p < 0.01.

3.3 Differences in dialysis facility distance and quality

On average, MA patients were treated at facilities 0.15 miles (95% CI: 0.06, 0.25) farther than TM patients living in the same ZIP code (Table 3). This estimate is modest given that the average distance was 7.79 miles. Across the four measures of facility quality, MA patients were treated at worse-quality dialysis facilities compared to TM patients living in the same ZIP code. The magnitude of these results depends on the dialysis facility quality measure used. The mortality rate estimate of 0.67 deaths per 100 patient-years (95% CI: 0.61, 0.73) implies a 3.1% difference relative to the mean of 21.85. The QIP total performance score estimate of 0.15 (95% CI: −0.28, −0.01) implies a 0.3% difference on the mean of 59.85.

TABLE 3. Quality and access differences of facilities treating Medicare advantage versus traditional Medicare dialysis patients.
Distance from patient ZIP to facility Facility mortality rate Facility QIP total performance score Facility penalized under ESRD QIP Facility five-star rating
Medicare Advantage 0.15*** 0.67*** −0.15** 0.50* −0.02***
[0.06, 0.25] [0.61, 0.73] [−0.28, −0.01] [−0.05, 1.05] [−0.03, −0.01]
Mean 7.79 21.85 59.85 45.77 3.72
N 138,891 140,317 141,722 141,722 139,961
Weighed N 376,799 380,205 384,166 384,166 378,861
  • Note: Includes point prevalent Medicare dialysis patients on July 15, 2018, as determined in 20% fee-for-service claims and 100% Medicare advantage encounter data. Entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients and 95% confidence intervals of the association between Medicare advantage enrollment (versus Traditional Medicare enrollment) and the given variable. All regressions include ZIP code fixed effects and adjust for dual eligibility status, race/ethnicity, sex, original reason for Medicare entitlement, age, and age squared. Observations were weighted by the inverse probability of being in the data. Distance is in miles. The mortality rate, which is case-mix adjusted, is per 100 patient-years. Facility Penalized under QIP is represented as 0/1. Estimates were multiplied by 100 so coefficients represent the difference in the percent probability of the treating facility being penalized.
  • Abbreviation: QIP, Quality Incentive Program.
  • * p < 0.1.
  • ** p < 0.05.
  • *** p < 0.01.

In Table 4, we investigate heterogeneity in quality differences by plan characteristics. First, patients in MA plans not owned by the largest five carriers traveled 0.61 miles further than TM patients in the same ZIP code (95% CI: 0.46, 0.75). There was no difference in facility distance between TM and MA patients in large carrier plans in the same ZIP code. The fact that differences in distance traveled by MA and TM enrollees for dialysis is evident only for plans not owned by the largest five carriers may reflect the stronger bargaining position of the largest five firms. Here, the point estimate of 0.61 would imply that MA patients in these plans going to dialysis 3 days a week would travel 3.66 miles further per week than those in TM. We also find that MA patients went to lower-quality facilities than TM patients regardless of carrier size. While the difference in facility mortality rate was higher for large carriers, this difference was not robust across all measures of dialysis facility quality (see Table 4 panel A).

TABLE 4. Quality and access differences in facilities treating Medicare advantage and traditional Medicare dialysis patients, by Medicare advantage plan characteristics.
Distance from patient ZIP to facility Facility mortality rate Facility QIP total performance score Facility penalized under QIP Facility five-star rating
Panel A: MA Plan carrier
TM Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
MA: Five largest carriers −0.03 0.82*** −0.13* 0.51* −0.02***
[−0.13, 0.07] [0.76,0.88] [−0.28, 0.01] [−0.08, 1.11] [−0.03, −0.01]
MA: Other carriers 0.61*** 0.31*** −0.19* 0.48 −0.02**
[0.46, 0.75] [0.22, 0.39] [−0.38, 0.01] [−0.32, 1.28] [−0.03, −0.00]
Panel B: MA Plan type
TM Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
MA: HMO 0.23*** 0.90*** −0.23*** 0.65** −0.02***
[0.13, 0.33] [0.83, 0.97] [−0.38, −0.07] [0.02, 1.28] [−0.03, −0.01]
MA: PPO −0.02 0.22*** 0.01 0.25 −0.02**
[−0.16, 0.12] [0.15, 0.29] [−0.17, 0.19] [−0.48, 0.98] [−0.03, −0.00]
MA: Other/Unknown 0.45** 0.20 0.01 −0.37 −0.02
[0.01, 0.89] [−0.05, 0.45] [−0.62, 0.63] [−2.89, 2.15] [−0.06, 0.03]
Mean 7.79 21.85 59.85 45.77 3.72
N 138,891 140,317 141,722 141,722 139,961
Weighted N 376,799 380,205 384,166 384,166 378,861
  • Note: Includes point prevalent Medicare dialysis patients on July 15, 2018, as determined in 20% fee-for-service claims and 100% Medicare advantage encounter data. Entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients of the association between Medicare advantage enrollment in the given plan/contract type (versus Traditional Medicare enrollment) and the given variable. All regressions include ZIP code fixed effects and adjust for dual eligibility status, race/ethnicity, sex, original reason for Medicare entitlement, age, and age squared. Each panel was estimated in a separate regression. Observations were weighted by the inverse probability of being in the data. Distance is in miles. The mortality rate, which is case-mix adjusted, is per 100 patient-years. Facility Penalized under QIP is represented as 0/1. Estimates were multiplied by 100 so coefficients represent the difference in the percent probability of the treating facility being penalized.
  • Abbreviations: MA, Medicare advantage; TM, traditional Medicare; HMO, Health Maintenance Organization; PPO, Preferred Provider Organization; QIP, Quality Incentive Program.
  • * p < 0.1.
  • ** p < 0.05.
  • *** p < 0.01.

Second, HMO patients traveled 0.23 miles further to dialysis than TM patients in the same ZIP code, while there was no statistically significant difference for PPO patients. This may reflect the fact that HMOs often have more restrictive networks. Differences in QIP TPS and mortality were higher for HMO than PPO patients, though this difference was not observed when examining facility five-star rating (see Table 4 panel B). In Table S1 of the supplemental materials, we examine heterogeneity by MA plan quality and ESKD SNP status. We found no consistent differences in facility distance or quality across plan types.

3.4 Sensitivity analyses

Studies comparing TM and MA patients are often limited by unobserved selection by risk. This is particularly true of studies on health outcomes, where unobserved factors correlated with MA enrollment may also be correlated with health status. Unlike health outcomes, facility choices may be less likely to be affected by this issue. Patients living in an area must choose from the same set of facilities. MA plans may influence facility choice directly via network design or indirectly through care management practices or the referral patterns of in-network nephrologists. Differences in risk across MA and TM would affect facility choice if patient preferences vary by risk or if facilities were able to select patients based on risk. We tested the robustness of our main results by including an adjustment for patient risk profile. The extent of upcoding in MA makes obtaining prevalent comorbidities from claims and encounter data unreliable.16, 17 Instead, because dialysis patients have high risk of hospitalization, we used a measure of hospitalization as a proxy for the underlying health status of a patient. Hospitalization is an imperfect proxy for risk because it is potentially modifiable by MA plans, but it is informative because it is not affected by coding practices in MA. We used two data sources to calculate the number of hospitalizations per month at risk (i.e., months with a dialysis claim or encounter) from January through July 2018. First, we used Medicare Provider and Review (MedPAR) data, which contains information on both TM and MA patients and is often used to compare hospital utilization between TM and MA.18 However, a small number of hospitals may not report MA discharges so the data may not be complete.19 Second, we used claims and encounter data. There are concerns that inpatient encounter data may not be complete. Past research has demonstrated some inconsistency between hospitalizations reported in encounter data and those reported in MedPAR.11 Although each of these methods has its limitations, together they provide useful sensitivity analyses to test the robustness of our results to adjustment for different measures of patient risk. We find that across ownership, distance, and facility quality outcomes, the main results are stable with additional adjustments for patient hospitalization rates (see Table S2 of Supplemental Materials).

3.5 Subgroup analyses

We also conducted subgroup analyses stratifying by modality, urbanicity, and market concentration. Estimates were generally similar across these subgroups. However, differences in DaVita and Fresenius ownership appeared to be larger in urban and less concentrated markets. Similarly, differences in driving distance were statistically significant in urban areas but not in rural areas. MA plans may be less able to engage in steering in rural and more concentrated markets, where there are fewer available choices (see Table S3 of Supplemental Materials).

4 DISCUSSION

Using data on point prevalent TM and MA dialysis patients from 2018, we found differences in the ownership and quality of dialysis facilities that treat TM and MA patients who live in the same ZIP code.

First, we found that MA patients were more likely to be treated at facilities owned by Fresenius and DaVita, the large dialysis organizations that control 75% of the outpatient dialysis market, and less likely to be treated at independently owned facilities. Examining differences across MA carriers, we found suggestive evidence that different insurers may have preferred relationships with one or the other large dialysis organizations. Past research has shown that these providers are able to charge particularly high prices to MA plans.10 Steering patients toward independently owned facilities might allow insurers to pay lower prices. That MA insurers do not do this may reflect lower transactions costs of negotiating with large national dialysis providers. It may also reflect the market power of the large national providers. One of the large dialysis organizations may be the only option in some markets because the average number of dialysis facilities per county is around two.20 While we found suggestive evidence that different MA carriers may have preferred relationships with one or the other of the large dialysis firms, our results imply that, even in plans run by these carriers, many patients are often treated at the non-preferred large dialysis organization. It may be that large national carriers are not able to provide adequate access to care without including facilities owned by both large chains in their networks. Past research argues that negotiations between carriers and large dialysis organizations occurs at the national level.10 Our results are in line with this observation because we find that MA enrollees are treated at both large dialysis firms, even when one large dialysis chain appears to be preferred by an insurance carrier. As MA enrollment grows, steering of patients toward the largest dialysis organizations may contribute to the continuing trend toward greater consolidation in the dialysis market.

Second, we found that MA patients travel further and are treated at lower-quality dialysis facilities than TM patients living in the same ZIP code. This finding, perhaps the result of the negotiation process between carriers and providers, is consistent with a broader literature suggesting that MA plans steer their enrollees to providers of varying quality.21-23 Our finding of lower quality was consistent in sign and statistical significance across four measures of dialysis facility quality. In addition, we found that at least some of these differences were present regardless of the characteristics of the MA plan. It is important to note that the magnitude of these differences was modest and may not be clinically significant. The difference in distance to the treating facility was, on average, 0.15 miles. Differences in quality ranged from 0.3 to 3.1% of the mean of the quality measure. These modest results are relevant for what they rule out. It is not the case, for example, that MA plans use tools like networks to encourage active selection of high-quality facilities, which is possible given the geography of facility quality in the dialysis market.6 How treatment at modestly lower-quality facilities translate into differences in patient outcomes is beyond the scope of this paper. The differences in facility quality are relatively modest, so they may not meaningfully affect patient outcomes. Past research shows minimal differences in mortality between TM and MA dialysis patients.24 However, these past findings are limited by the possibility that there are unobserved factors associated with both MA enrollment and patient mortality risk. The effect of MA on patient outcomes is driven not only by the distance to and quality of the treating dialysis facility, which may or may not have a causal effect on patient outcomes, but also other aspects of MA, like care management or supplemental benefits. Further research is needed to understand the overall causal effect of MA enrollment on ESKD patient outcomes, particularly as enrollment continues to expand.

This study has several limitations. First, we do not have information on the location of the patient's residence, only their ZIP code. Distance likely does not capture all the geographic determinants of access to dialysis care, for example, the ease of use of public transportation or driving time. Our distance measure is an approximation of travel time, which is the underlying, but unobservable, variable of interest. Second, the QIP total performance score, five-star rating, and mortality rate may not capture all aspects of quality of care provided at a facility. However, the use of the QIP total performance score in setting payment, the public reporting of the five-star rating for use by patients, and the importance of mortality as the ultimate measure of quality in dialysis care emphasizes the relevance of these measures, particularly when used together. Third, there may be unobservable differences between MA and TM patients, even after adjusting for ZIP code of residence and individual characteristics. This may affect the facility a patient uses if these differences are indicative of different underlying preferences or if facilities selectively admit patients based on these unobserved characteristics. However, because the set of facilities a patient can choose from is determined primarily by where they live, this issue is unlikely to substantively affect our results. Moreover, in sensitivity analyses we showed that the results are robust to adjustment for measures of patient risk. Finally, we used a cohort of prevalent dialysis patients. Given the high rates of MA disenrollment for ESKD patients, it is possible that some of the TM patients in this sample had left MA to join TM before they were observed in our analysis.25 If patients leave MA plans because they are not satisfied with the dialysis facilities in their plan's network, then our estimates may be a lower bound of actual differences in distance traveled and facility quality between TM and MA. Future work that disentangles the relationship between dialysis networks and MA disenrollment could provide additional insights.

The role of MA in shaping quality and access for dialysis patients is of growing importance because of likely ESKD MA enrollment growth after the 21st Century Cures Act, which occurred after our study period. How MA plans will react to these changes is unknown, though it will likely be determined, in part, by the difference between the risk-adjusted capitated payment paid to MA plans for dialysis patients and patient expenditures. Past research has shown that payments to plans are often less than expenditures. This has led to concerns that MA plans may pursue strategies such as creating restrictive provider networks for dialysis to discourage ESKD enrollment.3

Our results suggest that, in 2018, MA plans influenced dialysis facility choice. However, the relatively small magnitude of our estimates may make it unlikely that these differences translate into substantial differences in patient outcomes. With the recent implementation of the 21st Cures Act, the magnitude of this effect for 2022 and beyond may be quite different. Because we find that MA plans do steer facility choice, it will be important to monitor whether this worsens as ESKD patients become a greater share of MA enrollees and regulations related to dialysis facility choice are changed. The MA dialysis network adequacy requirements in place in 2018 were removed in 2021. CMS relaxed these requirements to reduce the negotiating power of dialysis providers while maintaining access for beneficiaries.3 If MA plans must have certain facilities in their networks to meet regulatory requirements, this undoubtedly provides substantial price-setting power to dialysis providers.10 However, as MedPAC has argued, the goal of reducing the negotiating power of providers by removing network adequacy standards is in tension with the goal of maintaining access. Insurers might be able to lower prices in the absence of network adequacy requirements by credibly threatening to remove facilities from their networks. If insurers follow through on this and remove facilities from their networks, this may reduce access to dialysis services or change where MA patients receive care.3 Further research, as more recent data becomes available, should examine the effect of the removal of network adequacy standards on dialysis facility choice. Although not a focus of this study, research and policy related to access to dialysis care should consider the availability of both in-center and home modalities, which is an increasingly important policy priority.26 As MA enrollment continues to grow, policymakers should ensure that ESKD patients are able to participate in MA and access high-quality dialysis care.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This research was supported by Arnold Ventures and the National Institute on Aging (T32AG066576).

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