Volume 27, Issue 4 p. 1605-1616
RESEARCH ARTICLE

Does natural environment prefer the right to the left? Governors' partisanship and corporate environmental performance

Byungjun Yu

Byungjun Yu

Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China

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Saixing Zeng

Corresponding Author

Saixing Zeng

Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China

Correspondence

Saixing Zeng, Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, No. 1954 Huashan Road, Xuhui District, Shanghai, China 200030.

Email: zengsaixing@sjtu.edu.cn

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Xiaohua Meng

Xiaohua Meng

School of Politics and Public Administration, Soochow University, Soochow, China

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Hanyang Ma

Hanyang Ma

SHU-UTS SILC Business School, Shanghai University, Shanghai, China

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Daxin Sun

Daxin Sun

Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China

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First published: 14 February 2020
Citations: 3

Funding information: National Natural Science Foundation of China, Grant/Award Numbers: 71390525, 71620107004, 71841021, 71573185

Abstract

This study investigates the relationship between governors' partisanship and the corporate environmental performance of firms in South Korea. According to political ideology perspective, governors' partisanship closely influences the policy directions and preferences of the provincial administration. Conservative (red) governors tend to induce and encourage competition among firms by deregulating and offering policy benefits to businesses at the provincial level. In response to increased competition in provinces governed by red governors, firms commit to aggressive environmental initiatives as a strategic differentiation tool, in contrast to their behavior in provinces controlled by liberal (blue) governors. Moreover, we examine a contingent role of the provincial Congress. According to the principle of checks and balances, the positive impact of red governors on a firm's environmental performance is stronger when the provincial Congress is controlled by the liberal (blue) party, with its checks and balances on the red governors. This study extends an institutional theory by exploring institutional setting mechanisms at the provincial level.

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