Original Article
A time to make laws and a time to fundraise? On the relation between salaries and time use for state politicians
Mitchell Hoffman,
Elizabeth Lyons,
Corresponding Author
Mitchell Hoffman
University of Toronto, Rotman School of Managament, NBER
Corresponding author: Mitchell Hoffman, Mitchell.Hoffman@rotman.utoronto.caSearch for more papers by this authorElizabeth Lyons
UC San Diego, School of Global Policy & Strategy
Search for more papers by this authorMitchell Hoffman,
Elizabeth Lyons,
Corresponding Author
Mitchell Hoffman
University of Toronto, Rotman School of Managament, NBER
Corresponding author: Mitchell Hoffman, Mitchell.Hoffman@rotman.utoronto.caSearch for more papers by this authorElizabeth Lyons
UC San Diego, School of Global Policy & Strategy
Search for more papers by this authorAbstract
Abstract.
We study the relationship between the level of compensation and time use for US state legislators. Using survey data on time use, we show that higher salary is robustly associated with legislators spending more time on fundraising. In contrast, higher salary is also robustly associated with less time spent on legislative activities and has no clear relation to time spent on constituent services. The fundraising results are particularly strong for legislators who do not intend to run for higher office. Our results are consistent with an interpretation that higher salary raises the value of office, and politicians respond with more fundraising because increased fundraising raises the chance of getting re-elected more than does increased legislative activity. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that a $30,000 increase in salary is associated with politicians annually devoting 13 more hours to fundraising and 18 fewer hours to legislative activity.
Résumé.
Un temps pour faire les lois et un autre pour lever des fonds? Étude du rapport entre le salaire et l’emploi du temps des législateurs d’état. Dans cet article, nous examinons le lien entre le niveau de rémunération et l’emploi du temps des législateurs d’état aux États-Unis. En nous appuyant sur plusieurs données d’enquêtes relatives à la gestion du temps, nous montrons que plus leur salaire est élevé, plus les législateurs ont tendance à consacrer du temps à lever des fonds, le temps dévolu aux activités législatives ayant, quant à lui, tendance à diminuer sans lien évident avec le temps passé en circonscription au service des citoyens. Les résultats relatifs aux levées de fonds sont particulièrement forts dès lors que les législateurs ne briguent pas de plus hautes fonctions, et sont conformes à l’interprétation selon laquelle un salaire élevé accroît l’intérêt pour une fonction. Et puisque l’augmentation des activités de financement ne se traduit pas par davantage d’activités législatives, mais par des chances de réélection accrues, les politiciens multiplient les levées de fonds. Des calculs rapides et approximatifs suggèrent qu’une hausse du salaire des politiciens de 30 000 $ par an représenterait 13 heures de collecte de fonds en plus, mais 18 heures d’activités législatives en moins annuellement.
Supporting Information
| Filename | Description |
|---|---|
| caje12465-sup-0001-OnlineAppendix.pdfPDF document, 722.5 KB |
Supplementary material accompanies the online version of this article. The data and code that support the findings of this study are available in the Canadian Journal of Economics Dataverse at https://doi.org/10.5683/SP3/QJPAVK. |
| caje12465-sup-0002-Data.zipZip archive, 1.2 MB |
Please note: The publisher is not responsible for the content or functionality of any supporting information supplied by the authors. Any queries (other than missing content) should be directed to the corresponding author for the article.
References
- Akerlof, G. (1982) “Labor contracts as partial gift exchange,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 97(4), 543–69
- Altonji, J.G., T. E. Elder, and C. R. Taber (2005) “Selection on observed and unobserved variables: Assessing the effectiveness of catholic schools,” Journal of Political Economy 113(1), 151–84
- Bandiera, O., S. Hansen, A. Prat, and R. Sadun (2020) “CEO behavior and firm performance,” Journal of Political Economy 128(4), 1325–69
- Bandiera, O., R. Lemos, A. Prat, and R. Sadun (2017) “Managing the family firm: Evidence from CEOs at work,” Review of Financial Studies 31(5), 1605–53
- Baqir, R. (2002) “Districting and government overspending,” Journal of Political Economy 110(6), 1318–54
- Barro, R. (1973) “The control of politicians: An economic model,” Public Choice 14, 19–42
10.1007/BF01718440 Google Scholar
- Becker, G.S. (1965) “A theory of the allocation of time,” Economic Journal 75(299), 493–517
- Becker, G.S., and G. J. Stigler (1974) “Law enforcement, malfeasance, and compensation of enforcers,” Journal of Legal Studies 3(1), 1–18
- Berkman, M.B. (1994) “State legislators in congress: Strategic politicians, professional legislatures, and the party nexus,” American Journal of Political Science 38(4), 1025–55
- Bertrand, M., M. Bombardini, and F. Trebbi (2014) “Is it whom you know or what you know? An empirical assessment of the lobbying process,” American Economic Review 104( 12), 3885–920
- Bertrand, M., E. Duflo, and S. Mullainathan (2004) “How much should we trust differences-in-differences estimates?,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(1), 249–75
- Besley, T. (2004) “Paying politicians: Theory and evidence,” Journal of the European Economic Association 2(2–3), 193–215
- Besley, T., and A. Case (1995) “Does electoral accountability affect economic policy choices? Evidence from gubernatorial term limits,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 110(3), 769–98
- Branson, R. (2013, July 11) ‘Should politicians be paid more?” [blog post]. Retrieved from www.virgin.com/richard-branson/should-politicians-be-paid-more
- Carey, J.M., R. G. Niemi, and L. W. Powell (1995) “ State legislative survey and contextual data, 1995,” Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. DOI:10.3886/ICPSR03021.v1
- Carey, J. M., R. G. Niemi, and L. W. Powell (2002) “ 2002 state legislative survey and contextual data,” Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. DOI:10.3886/ICPSR20960.v1
- Carnes, N., and E. R. Hansen (2016) “Does paying politicians more promote economic diversity in legislatures?,” American Political Science Review 110(4), 699–716
- Carvell, T., D. Gurewitch, J. Maurer, J. Oliver, J. Twiss, and J. Weiner (writers) (2016, April 3) “ Political fundraising.” In Avalon Television & Sixteen String Jack Productions (producers), Last Week Tonight with John Oliver. New York: HBO
- Caselli, F., and M. Morelli (2004) “Bad politicians,” Journal of Public Economics 883–4), 759–82
- Chetty, R., J. N. Friedman, and J. E. Rockoff (2014) “Measuring the impacts of teachers I: Evaluating bias in teacher value-added estimates,” American Economic Review 104(9), 2593–632
- Dal Bó, E., F. Finan, and M. A. Rossi (2013) “Strengthening state capabilities: The role of financial incentives in the call to public service,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 128(3), 1169–218
- Dearden, J.A., and T. A. Husted (1993) “Do governors get what they want? An alternative examination of the line-item veto,” Public Choice 77(4), 707–23
- Di Tella, R., and R. Fisman (2004) “Are politicians really paid like bureaucrats?,” Journal of Law & Economics 47(2), 477–513
- Diermeier, D., M. Keane, and A. Merlo (2005) “A political economy model of congressional careers,” American Economic Review 95(1), 347–73
- Dollar, D., R. Fisman, and R. Gatti (2001) “Are women really the fairer sex? Corruption and women in government,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 46(4), 423–29
- Esteves-Sorenson, C., and R. Broce (2016) “ Do monetary incentives undermine performance on intrinsically enjoyable tasks? A field test,” working paper, Yale University
- Ferraz, C., and F. Finan (2008) “Exposing corrupt politicians: The effects of Brazil's publicly released audits on electoral outcomes,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 123(2), 703–45
- Ferraz, C., and F. Finan (2010) “ Motivating politicians: The impacts of monetary incentives on quality and performance,” working paper, UC Berkeley
- Fiorina, M.P. (1994) “Divided government in the American states: A byproduct of legislative professionalism?,” American Political Science Review 88(2), 304–16
- Fisman, R., N. A. Harmon, E. Kamenica, and I. Munk (2015) “Labor supply of politicians,” Journal of the European Economic Association 13(5), 871–905
- Francia, P.L., and P. S. Herrnson (2003) “The impact of public finance laws on fundraising in state legislative elections,” American Politics Research 31(5), 520–39
- Freeman, P.K., and L. E. Richardson, Jr. (1996) “Explaining variation in casework among state legislators,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 21(1), 41–56
- Gagliarducci, S., and T. Nannicini (2013) “Do better paid politicians perform better? Disentangling incentives from selection,” Journal of the European Economic Association 11(2), 369–98
- Gagliarducci, S., T. Nannicini, and P. Natichioni (2010) “Moonlighting politicians,” Journal of Public Economics 94(9–10), 688–99
- Gierzynski, A., and D. Breaux (1996) “Legislative elections and the importance of money,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 21(3), 337–57
- Gilligan, T.W., and J. G. Matsusaka (1995) “Deviations from constituent interests: The role of legislative structure and political parties in the states,” Economic Inquiry 33(3), 383–401
- Groseclose, T., and K. Krehbiel (1994) “Golden parachutes, rubber checks, and strategic retirements from the 102d house,” American Journal of Political Science 38(1), 75–99
- Groseclose, T., and J. Snyder (1996) “Buying supermajorities,” American Political Science Review 90(2), 303–15
- Hall, A.B. (2019) Who Wants to Run? How the Devaluing of Political Office Drives Polarization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
10.7208/chicago/9780226609607.001.0001 Google Scholar
- Hall, R.L., and R. P. Van Houweling (1995) “Avarice and ambition in Congress: Representatives’ decisions to run or retire from the US House,” American Political Science Review 89(1), 121–36
- Hamermesh, D.S., and G. A. Pfann (2005) The Economics of Time Use, vol. 271. Amsterdam, San Diego and Oxford: Elsevier
- Herzog, A.R., and J. G. Bachman (1981) “Effects of questionnaire length on response quality,” Public Opinion Quarterly 45(4), 549–59
- Hoffman, M., and E. Lyons (2016) “ A time to make laws and a time to fundraise? On the relation between salaries and time use for state politicians,” NBER working paper no. 22571
- Hogan, R.E., and K. E. Hamm (1998) “ Variations in district-level campaign spending in state legislatures.” In J. A. Thompson and G. F. Moncrief, eds., Campaign Finance in State Legislative Elections, pp. 59–79. Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press
- Holmstrom, B., and P. Milgrom (1991) “Multitask principal–agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design,” Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 7, 24–52
- Jones, W.H., and G. Linda (1978) “Multiple criteria effects in a mail survey experiment,” Journal of Marketing Research 15(2), 280–84
- Kalt, J.P., and M. A. Zupan (1990) “The apparent ideological behavior of legislators: Testing for principal–agent slack in political institutions,” Journal of Law and Economics 33(1), 103–31
- Keane, M., and A. Merlo (2010) “Money, political ambition, and the career decisions of politicians,” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2(3), 186–215
- Kelderman, E. (2007, February 13) “Legislators’ pay falling behind.” Pew: Stateline. Available at www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2007/02/13/legislators-pay-falling-behind
- Kotakorpi, K., and P. Poutvaara (2011) “Pay for politicians and candidate selection: An empirical analysis,” Journal of Public Economics 95(7–8), 877–85
- Kurtz, K.T., G. Moncrief, R. G. Niemi, and L. W. Powell (2006) “Full-time, part-time, and real time: Explaining state legislators’ perceptions of time on the job,” State Politics & Policy Quarterly 6(3), 322–38
- Levitt, S.D., and J. A. List (2011) “Was there really a Hawthorne effect at the Hawthorne plant? An analysis of the original illumination experiments,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 3(1), 224–38
- List, J.A., and D. M. Sturm (2006) “How elections matter: Theory and evidence from environmental policy,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 121(4), 1249–81
- Mahoney, N. (2015) “Bankruptcy as implicit health insurance,” American Economic Review 105(2), 710–46
- Marble, W., and N. Lee (2018) “ Why not run? Assessing disincentives to office-seeking,” mimeo, Stanford University. Available at www.dropbox.com/s/j94p1j8ynas41kl/why_not_run_v0.2.pdf?dl=0
- Mas, A. (2017) “Does transparency lead to pay compression?,” Journal of Political Economy 125(5), 1683–721
- Mattozzi, A., and A. Merlo (2007) “The transparency of politics and the quality of politicians,” American Economic Review 97(2), 311–15
- Mattozzi, A., and A. Merlo (2008) “Political careers or career politicians?,” Journal of Public Economics 92(3-4), 597–608
- Mellström, C., and M. Johannesson (2008) “Crowding out in blood donation: Was Titmuss right?,” Journal of the European Economic Association 6(4), 845–63
- Messner, M., and M. K. Polborn (2004) “Paying politicians,” Journal of Public Economics 88(12), 2423–45
- Miller, M.G. (2016) “The power of an hour: Effects of candidate time expenditure in state legislative elections,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 41(2), 327–59
- Mocan, N., and D. T. Altindag (2013) “Salaries and work effort: An analysis of the European Union parliamentarians,” Economic Journal 123(573), 1130–67
- Moretti, E. (2013) “Real wage inequality,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 5(1), 65–103
- National Conference of State Legislatures (2000) A New Perspective on Representative Democracy: A Guide for Legislative Interns. Denver: NCSL
- National Conference of State Legislatures (2017) “ Full- and part-time legislatures.” Available at www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/legislatures/full-and-part-time-legislatures.aspx. Accessed March 17, 2019
- National Conference of State Legislatures (2019) “ State limits on contributions to candidates.” Available at www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/state-limits-on-contributions-to-candidates.aspx. Accessed February 25, 2019
- Oster, E. (2019) “Unobservable selection and coefficient stability: Theory and evidence,” Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 37(2), 187–204
- Poutvaara, P., and T. Takalo (2007) “Candidate quality,” International Tax and Public Finance 14(1), 7–27
- Powell, L.W. (2012) The Influence of Campaign Contributions in State Legislatures: The Effects of Institutions and Politics. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press
10.3998/mpub.2454352 Google Scholar
- Rehavi, M.M. (2007) “ Sex and politics: Do female legislators affect state spending?,” mimeo, University of California Berkeley
- Shapiro, C., and J. E. Stiglitz (1984) “Equilibrium unemployment as a worker discipline device,” American Economic Review 74(3), 433–44
- Shevlin, P., and M. Doran (producers) (2016, April 24). “Are members of congress becoming telemarketers?” In 60 Minutes. New York: CBS
- Spenkuch, J., and D. Toniatti (2018) “Political advertising and election outcomes,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 133(4), 1981–2036
- Squire, P. (1997) “Another look at legislative professionalization and divided government in the states,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 22(3), 417–32
- Stepner, M. (2013) “ BINSCATTER: Stata module to generate binned scatterplots,” Boston College Department of Economics
- Titiunik, R. (2016) “Drawing your senator from a jar: Term length and legislative behavior,” Political Science Research and Methods 4(2), 293–316
- Tomaskovic-Devey, D., J. Leiter, and S. Thompson (1994) “Organizational survey nonresponse,” Administrative Science Quarterly 39(3), 439–57
- VanDusky-Allen, J. (2014) “The conditional effect of term limits on electoral activities,” Politics & Policy 42(3), 431–58
10.1111/polp.12072 Google Scholar
- Volden, C., and A. E. Wiseman (2014) Legislative Effectiveness in the United States Congress: The Lawmakers. New York: Cambridge University Press
10.1017/CBO9781139032360 Google Scholar
- Weber, M. (2004) The Vocation Lectures: Science as a Vocation, Politics as a Vocation (Rodney Livingstone, Trans). New York: Hackett Publishing Co. Inc. (original work published 1919)
- Weiss, A.W. (1980) “Job queues and layoffs in labor markets with flexible wages,” Journal of Political Economy 88(3), 526–38
