Revolving doors in international financial governance

‘Revolving doors’ is a well-suspected phenomenon of skills and knowledge transfer between the private and public sectors. It is thought to be especially notable among elites in transnational policy networks, where mobility can accrue status. In this article, we investigate revolving doors in the area of international financial governance. We target policymakers linked to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the International Monetary Fund's Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP). We test for revolving doors by examining the career histories of those working with the BCBS on the development of the Basel II accord, and staff on policy teams for financial systems monitoring via FSAP missions. Using sequence analysis, we trace career histories between 1971 and 2011 to observe the extent of revolving doors. Revolving doors are observed in club-like elite policy communities but are less prevalent in policy teams in intergovernmental organizations. We find that revolving doors are important in establishing intellectual capture in how an issue is treated within transnational policy networks.