Competition in the acquisition market and acquirers' long-run performance
Corresponding Author
Syed Shams
University of Southern Queensland, Queensland, Australia
Correspondence
Syed Shams, School of Commerce, University of Southern Queensland, Toowoomba, Qld 4350, Australia.
Email: syed.shams@usq.edu.au
Search for more papers by this authorCorresponding Author
Syed Shams
University of Southern Queensland, Queensland, Australia
Correspondence
Syed Shams, School of Commerce, University of Southern Queensland, Toowoomba, Qld 4350, Australia.
Email: syed.shams@usq.edu.au
Search for more papers by this authorAbstract
Using a large sample of completed acquisition deals in Australia, this study examines the influence of competition in the acquisition market on the long-run operating performance of acquirers of private target firms in comparison to that of acquirers of public target firms. We find that, in contrast to acquirers targeting private firms, those targeting public firms improve their performance in the long run through competition-induced bids. However, in a competitive takeover market, public target acquirers experience significant declines in performance when acquiring targets that are labelled high performers. Additionally, public target acquirers report improved performance when acquiring a significant ownership stake in target firms.
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Table S1. Definitions of variables Table S2. Regression estimates using year+3 ISPACFR as the dependent variable Table S3. Regression estimates after reducing size differences between two samples (public and private targets) |
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