Actions, habits and forms of life

After a survey on the work of prominent philosophers within the Western tradition, it can be noticed a tendency to view habits as automatic, unfree and unconscious behaviour. In this context, this article attempts to show that habits are actually much closer to the characteristics that are otherwise attributed to actions. That is, following the dialectical approach of Sartre, I develop arguments to support that habits are conscious actions carried out with a sense of identification towards the form of life that actions, in turn, project as a whole; in this way, each form of life requires a set of habits that the agent performs freely and rationally, understanding the latter as the dialectical procedure by which the act itself brings about a totalizing identity. This vision implies that habits are interrelated and codependent within a network of social behavior, so they cannot be discarded without discarding the form of life to which they belong. That is, a change of habit requires a change in the totality of which it is a part. But that change can only occur if social agents become aware that their habits are a product of their free acceptance and not of necessity. In the article, this latter is paradigmatically exemplified by neoliberal capitalism as a form of life.