Original Article
Lost at Sea: A New Route to Metaphysical Skepticism
Aaron Segal,
Aaron Segal
Department of Philosophy, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Search for more papers by this authorAaron Segal,
Aaron Segal
Department of Philosophy, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Search for more papers by this authorAbstract
Global metaphysical skepticism is the view that we have no knowledge of any substantive metaphysical thesis. Various reasons have been provided in support of global metaphysical skepticism. I provide a new one. The reason, very roughly, is this. Metaphysical theses come together as packages. Such packages are very different from each other. Because the packages are so different, we cannot know of any one of the packages that it isn't true. And because we cannot know of any one of them that it isn't true, we cannot know any substantive metaphysical thesis at all. My paper makes this argument much more precise and defends each of the premises in detail.
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