Original Article
Hypocrisy, Standing to Blame and Second-Personal Authority
Adam Piovarchy,
Adam Piovarchy
Department of Philosophy, The University of Sydney
Search for more papers by this authorAdam Piovarchy,
Adam Piovarchy
Department of Philosophy, The University of Sydney
Search for more papers by this authorAbstract
This paper identifies why hypocrites lack the standing to blame others for certain wrongs. By identifying problems with thinking of hypocritical blame as inappropriate and examining how the concept of standing is used in other contexts, I argue that we should think of standing to blame as a status that grants agents a normative power. Using Darwall's account of second-personal obligations, I argue that hypocrites lack the standing to blame because they lack the authority to blame. Hypocrites lack this authority because they fail to accept other people's second-personal authority to make similar demands on them.
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