Robert Alexy and the Dual Nature of Law
Professor of Jurisprudence, Department of Law, Stockholm University. I would like to thank the participants in the advanced seminar in practical philosophy, Uppsala University, especially Victor Moberger, for helpful comments on the article. I would also like to thank Christoph Bezemek, Åke Frändberg, and Karl Pettersson for helpful comments on various versions of the article, and Robert Alexy and the participants in the workshop Law in Quest of Its Promise: Discussing Professor Robert Alexy's Legal Theory at the Tallinn University School of Governance, Law, and Society for helpful comments on my presentation of the main ideas in this article. In addition, I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for identifying difficulties in the text and for suggesting improvements. Last but not least, I would like to thank Robert Carroll for checking my English. As always, the author alone is responsible for any remaining mistakes and imperfections.
Abstract
Robert Alexy's claim that law of necessity has a dual nature raises many interesting philosophical questions. In this article, I consider some of these questions, such as what the meaning of the correctness thesis is, whether Alexy's discourse theory supports this thesis, and whether the thesis is defensible; whether Alexy's argument from anarchy and civil war supports the claim that law of necessity has a real dimension; and what the implications are of the use of moral arguments, such as the argument from injustice, for the status of Alexy's inquiry.
