Original Article
The Mask of Neutrality: Judicial Partisan Calculation and Legislative Redistricting
Jordan Carr Peterson,
Corresponding Author
Jordan Carr Peterson
Address correspondence to Jordan Carr Peterson, Texas Christian University, Department of Political Science, TCU Box 297021, Fort Worth, TX 76129, USA. Telephone: (904) 704-3335; Email: jordancarrpeterson@gmail.com.Search for more papers by this authorJordan Carr Peterson,
Corresponding Author
Jordan Carr Peterson
Address correspondence to Jordan Carr Peterson, Texas Christian University, Department of Political Science, TCU Box 297021, Fort Worth, TX 76129, USA. Telephone: (904) 704-3335; Email: jordancarrpeterson@gmail.com.Search for more papers by this authorI would like to thank Christian Grose and Jeb Barnes for their helpful comments on this article. I would also like to acknowledge the Southern California Law and Social Science Forum for providing a place to share an early version of the work.
Abstract
Do judges ruling on redistricting litigation increase electoral competition in congressional races while simultaneously drawing districts favoring their party's congressional candidates? I offer a novel theory of judicial partisan calculation, arguing that judges draw more competitive districts than legislatures or commissions, but that judge-drawn districts favor the electoral interests of their copartisans. These claims are reconcilable because judges target districts held by contrapartisan legislators to maximize their copartisans’ fortunes. I find that Democratic judges draw competitive districts by adding Democratic voters to Republican-held House constituencies. Court-administered redistricting increases competitiveness, ostensibly due to judicial neutrality. This mask of neutrality, however, conceals sophisticated partisan calculation.
Supporting Information
| Filename | Description |
|---|---|
| lapo12132-sup-0001-Supinfo.docxWord 2007 document , 69.2 KB | Appendix S1: Supporting Information |
Please note: The publisher is not responsible for the content or functionality of any supporting information supplied by the authors. Any queries (other than missing content) should be directed to the corresponding author for the article.
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